La Bohume by Dewar, Neil
La Bohume
May 30, 2017
1 Introduction
David Lewis, famously, suggested a certain kind of picture of what the world is like.
He called that picture Humean supervenience, and described it as follows:
Humean Supervenience [. . . ] says that in a world like ours, the fundamen-
tal relations are exactly the spatiotemporal relations: distance relations,
both spacelike and timelike, and perhaps also occupancy relations between
point-sized things and spacetime points. And it says that in a world like
ours, the fundamental properties are local qualities: perfectly natural in-
trinsic properties of points, or of point-sized occupants of points. Therefore
it says that all else supervenes on the spatiotemporal arrangement of local
qualities throughout all of history, past and present and future.1
However, there is a concern that Humean Supervenience is inconsistent with our best
physical theories.2 More specically, there is a concern that the kind of world de-
scribed by Lewis above—one which is fully and exhaustively characterised by the as-
signment of intrinsic qualities to points of spacetime—could not be a world described
by quantum mechanics.3 More specically still, the concern is that the characteristic
quantum-mechanical phenomenon of entanglement rules out the possibility of giving
1(Lewis, 1994, p. 474)
2Teller (1986), Maudlin (2007)
3To be strictly accurate, there are good reasons for thinking that Humean supervenience, at least on
the letter of the above, is inconsistent with classical physics. However, one can get around this by
(roughly speaking) taking “local qualities” to be intrinsic properties of innitesimally small space-
time regions, rather than spacetime points per se (see Buttereld (2006)). I will ignore this subtlety
for the purposes of this essay.
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an exhaustive description of the world by describing it point-by-point. So (according
to these arguments), insofar as we take quantum mechanics to be true (i.e., insofar
as we take the actual world to be accurately described by quantum mechanics), we
should not take Humean Supervenience to be true either.
More recently, however, there has been a ghtback on behalf of Humean Superve-
nience: it has been argued that, at least if one is a Bohmian about quantummechanics,4
then Humean Supervenience remains a consistent option after all. This paper seeks to
resist this most recent defence of Humean Supervenience. First, I introduce the rele-
vant pieces of Bohmianmechanics, and indicate the prima facie tension between entan-
glement and Humean Supervenience. Second, I discuss the argument that Bohmian
Humeans (from here on out, “Bohumeans”)make to render their ontology compatible
with Humean Supervenience. I then raise three problems for this argument: a prob-
lem concerning the status of the newly-introduced ontology; a problem concerning
determinacy of quantities; and a problem concerning scientic practice.
Before I start, I want to clarify that this paper is not about whether some suitably
modied version of Humean Supervenience is compatible with quantum mechanics.
For instance, Loewer and Albert have observed that quantum mechanics, standardly
formulated, is straightforwardly compatible with the requirement that qualities be lo-
cal in conguration space, rather than physical space;5 whilst Darby has argued that
we can preserve the “spirit” of Lewis’ proposal by allowing that there are funda-
mental relations besides the spatiotemporal relations.6 All three note that doing so
is consistent with Lewis’ broader Humean goal of recovering all else (all mental and
nomological facts, in particular) from the categorical world, i.e., from a particular dis-
tribution of non-modal properties and relations. This is all well and good, but not my
concern here. I am exclusively attending to the question of whether the specic va-
riety of Humean Supervenience defended by Lewis (that requiring the locality of all
fundamental properties in physical space) can be rendered consistent with quantum
mechanics.
4Esfeld (2014) claims that the proposed rescue of Humean Supervenience is available to any
“primitive-ontology” approach to quantum mechanics, not just Bohmian mechanics. It’s not my
intention to examine this claim in this essay: in the interests of brevity, I will focus on the specic
case of Bohmianism (though see fn. 12).
5See e.g. Loewer (1996), Albert (1996).
6Darby (2012)
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2 Entanglement in Bohmian mechanics
The fundamental entities of Bohmian mechanics are the particles: pointlike objects,
which have denite positions at all times, and which are held to be the fundamental
constituents ofmacroscropicmatter.7 Thus, ifwe haveN particles, then their collective
state at any given time may be represented by an N -tuple (Q1, . . . , QN) of points of
X , where X is the space representing physical space—that is, by a single point Q in
the N -fold conguration space XN (the N -fold direct product of X with itself). The
behaviour of the particles is determined by the wavefunction, a function Ψ : XN → C,
via the guidance equation
dQi
dt
=
~
mi
Im
(∇iΨ
Ψ
(Q)
)
(1)
where mi is the mass of the ith particle, and ∇i denotes the gradient associated with
the ith productand of XN . (This is all in the absence of spin: for the purposes of
this essay, we need only consider spinless particles.) The wavefunction itself evolves
according to the usual Schrödinger equation,
i~
dΨ
dt
= HΨ (2)
where H is the Hamiltonian.
The challenge for the aspiring Bohumean may now be stated quite succintly: the
wavefunction cannot be any part of a Humean Supervenience basis, and hence cannot
(for one attracted by Lewis’ picture) be interpreted as a fundamental physical com-
ponent of the world. For, the wavefunction assigns values (complex numbers) to N -
tuples of points of space, not to individual points of space. But the Humean Super-
venience basis was required to include only local qualities, i.e., those comprising the
assignment of intrinsic properties to individual spacetime points (or to point-sized
occupants of spacetime points). So the wavefunction is not the kind of local prop-
erty with which Lewis would be happy, unless there is some way of showing that
any given wavefunction can be reduced to (uniquely specied by) some collection of
suitably local qualities.
Certainly, there are specic circumstances in which such a reduction is possible:
those in which the wavefunction is not entangled. For simplicity, let N = 2; now sup-
7My presentation of Bohmian mechanics here follows that of Dürr et al. (1992) and Dürr and Teufel
(2009).
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pose that the wavefunction Ψ(x1, x2) is a product wavefunction,
Ψ(x1, x2) = ψ1(x1)ψ2(x2) (3)
for some ψ1 : X → C and ψ2 : X → C. Then since
∇1(ψ1ψ2)
ψ1ψ2
=
∇1ψ1
ψ1
(4)
and similarly for particle 2, we nd that the general guidance equation (1) decomposes
into the two individual guidance equations
dQ1
dt
=
~
m1
Im
(∇1ψ1
ψ1
(Q1)
)
(5a)
dQ2
dt
=
~
m2
Im
(∇2ψ2
ψ2
(Q2)
)
(5b)
So in a case such as this, where the joint wavefunction is simply a product of single-
particle wavefunctions, we can make the joint wavefunction Humeanistically accept-
able by regarding it as a “conjunction” of duly local individual wavefunctions.
The problem, though, is that generic wavefunctions are entangled, i.e., are not ex-
pressible as a product of single-particle wavefunctions. Still with N = 2, consider as
an example
Ψ(x1, x2) =
1√
2
(ψ1(x1)ψ2(x2) + ψ
′
1(x1)ψ
′
2(x2)) (6)
where
∫
X
ψ∗1ψ
′
1 dx1 = 0 =
∫
X
ψ∗2ψ
′
2 dx2. The sum (6) cannot be factorised into a single
product, and so we cannot treat it as simply arising from some pair of assignments to
the points of X individually.
The nearest proxies for individual wavefunctions, in a case such as (6), are the condi-
tional wavefunctions.8 The conditional wavefunction of particle 1, relative to particle
2’s being in location Q2, is given by
ΨQ21 (x1) := Ψ(x1, Q2) (7)
and similarly for the conditional wavefunction of particle 2, relative to particle 1’s be-
ing in locationQ1. More generally, given anN -particle jointwavefunctionΨ(x1, . . . , xN),
ifwe select (say) the rstM < N particles as a subsystem, then the conditional wavefunc-
8The below follows (Dürr and Teufel, 2009, chap. 11).
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tion of that subsystem (relative to the conguration of the remainingN −M particles)
is given by
ΨY1...M(x) := Ψ(x,Y) (8)
where x := (x1, . . . , xM) and Y := (QM+1, . . . , QN). That is, the conditional wave-
function of the subsystem is obtained by “saturating” the joint wavefunction with the
actual locations of the remaining particles.
The importance of the conditional wavefunction is as follows. Suppose that the joint
wavefunction is of the form
Ψ(x,y) = φ(x)ψ(y) + Ψ⊥(x,y) (9)
where y = xM+1, . . . , xN and Ψ⊥ and ψ have macroscopically disjoint y-supports;
moreover, suppose that the actual conguration Y of the environment is in the sup-
port of ψ (so that Ψ⊥(x,Y) = 0 for all x). It then follows that the conditional wave-
function ΨY1,...,M is given by the wavefunction φ—and furthermore, that the guidance
equation for the subsystem’s congurationX := (Q1, . . . , QM) reduces to
dX
dt
=
~
m
Im
(∇xφ
φ
(X)
)
(10)
where m = (m1, . . . ,mM). In such a case, we say that φ is an eective wavefunction
for the subsystem. If the subsystem is suciently decoupled from its environment,
then the eective wavefunction will also abide by Schrödinger’s equation; if there is
interaction, however, then it will not evolve in this unitary fashion.
It is, however, important to note that although the conditional wavefunctions of
the subsystems can be computed from the “universal wavefunction” Ψ and the actual
conguration Q, the reverse is not true: the conditional wavefunctions associated to
subsystems underdetermine the joint wavefunction. For example, in the two-particle
case, one can easily have a distinct pair of joint wavefunctions Ψ(x1, x2) and Φ(x1, x2)
such that Ψ(x1, Q2) = Φ(x1, Q2) and Ψ(Q1, x2) = Φ(Q1, x2): that agreement only re-
quires that they coincide on certain surfaces within conguration space. Moreover, in
the casewhere the subsystem and the environment are coupled to one another, it is not
just that the conditional wavefunction does not evolve according to the Schrödinger
dynamics—in general, therewill not be any autonomous dynamics for the conditional
wavefunction at all.
One more remark. In the above, I have followed orthodoxy by supposing that the
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best way to interpret the wavefunction “ontologically” is as a eld of some sort (i.e., as
assigning properties to points of conguration space). But as Belot (2011) points out,
Bohmians have a reasonably natural alternative: that of interpreting the wavefunction
as representing a collective property of the particles. Each possible wavefunction, on
this view, would be a kind of dispositional property which specied, for each possible
conguration of the collective of particles, how the particles would behave if they
found themselves in that conguration. However, this interpretationwould be subject
to the same problem as the more mainstream interpretation in terms of elds: at any
given time, a collective of N particles is an occupant of N spacetime points, not an
occupant of a (single) spacetime point, and so the wavefunction is not the kind of
local property that can be safely admitted into the Humean Supervenience basis.
3 The Humean response
As mentioned in §1, I am not going to consider responses that modify the Lewisian
statement of Humean Supervenience; my interest in this essay is in responses which
preserve the letter as well as the spirit of Humean Supervenience. Doing that requires
that everything in the supervenience basis——everything that comprises the funda-
mental ontology—is local in space and time. As we have just seen, though, the wave-
function is not spatiotemporally local in the required sense. So that leaves only one
option: deny that the wavefunction is part of the supervenience basis.
The natural next question, then, is what the status of the quantum state is on this
picture. If standard Bohmian mechanics is indeed to be recovered, then it had better
be the case that the wavefunction—like everything else—supervenes upon the super-
venience basis, i.e., upon the motions of the Bohmian particles. The proposal by a
number of recent authors9 is that the Bohmian trajectories determine both the quan-
tum dynamics and the wavefunction, through the same “best-system” method that
Humeans take to determine what the laws of nature are. That is, the idea is that of the
candidate dynamics-plus-wavefunction packages, precisely one will maximise sim-
plicity and strength (under some appropriate weighting); and this package is the one
which the Humean takes to be the correct characterisation of what’s going on.
In general, these authors seem more or less sympathetic to the idea that the super-
venience basis be extremely austere: that it be constituted by nothing other than the
9Miller (2014), Callender (2014), Bhogal and Perry (2015), Esfeld et al. (2014); Dickson (2000)also pre-
gures some of the relevant ideas.
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Bohmian trajectories. Such austerity may not be necessary, however. The Bohumean
could include other data in their supervenience basis, provided only that such data are
appropriately local. (The advantage of doing so is that the richer the supervenience
basis, the more plausible it is that the full Bohmian dynamics really will supervene
upon it.) For instance, they could perhaps include such particle properties as mass
or charge, or (total) spin10—provided that such properties are construed as intrinsic
properties of the Bohmian particles, rather than characteristics of the wavefunction.11
They could even include the conditional wavefunction of each particle (relative to the
other N − 1 particles), although this might need some explanation of why the condi-
tional wavefunctions get to be part of the fundamental ontology but the joint wave-
functions do not.12
So, the picture is as follows. We take as given our supervenience basis, which cer-
tainly includes the Bohmian trajectories, and may or may not include other local data
(e.g. particle-properties or the conditional wavefunction). In order to specify the best
system, we need to then introduce a new piece of theoretical vocabulary: that of the
wavefunction, Ψ. The Humean should then claim that the best system for codifying
H is one which asserts the following:13
• That Ψ is a complex-valued eld on T ×XN
• That Ψ satises the Schrödinger equation
10That is, the spin quantum number of the particles; not the projection of the spin along some axis,
which cannot plausibly be interpreted as a property of the particle rather than the wavefunction
(see e.g. (Dürr and Teufel, 2009, §8.4)).
11Note that doing so is not entirely straightforward: see Brown et al. (1996).
12Esfeld (2014) observes that other primitive ontologies could be used to provide alternative austere
supervenience bases; it’s not so clear that other primitive ontologies are so amenable to forming
the richer bases discussed here, however. For example, if the mass of a particle is to be localised by
being taken as a property of the particle, then the primitive ontology for that particle will have to be
a point-sized occupant of some spatial point (at each time), as is the case in Bohmian mechanics. In
GRWmorGRWf, by contrast, the primitive ontology of the particle is either a region-sized occupant,
or else a point-sized occupant of multiple spatial points at each time (and in the case of ashes,
sometimes an occupant of no point)—so treatingmass as a property of a particle with that primitive
ontology would not mean that mass was a local quality.
13Bhogal and Perry (2015) use a best system which postulates a space Q (with the structure of XN )
and a particle ω moving around within Q (whose location at any time is exactly correlated with
the conguration of the N particles); the wavefunction is then postulated as a function assigning a
complex number to each point of Q, which then acts on ω via the guidance equation. If Q here is
intended to simply be dened asXN (i.e., as the space consisting ofN -tuples of points ofX), then I
take these systems to be essentially the same. If not—that is, if the idea is to stipulate Q’s structure
separately and then put it into appropriate correspondence with N -tuples of points of X—then it
seems to me that the system outlined here will be considerably simpler, at no cost in strength.
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• That the location of each particle, together with Ψ, satises the Bohmian guid-
ance equation
• That the Quantum Equilibrium Hypothesis (QEH) holds:14 i.e., that the proba-
bility distribution of particles15 is given by |Ψ|2
• Perhaps: that Ψ(0,x) has such-and-such a value at x, for each x ∈ XN
We will discuss later whether the Bohumean should think that the nal ingredient
mentioned here should be included in the best system.
Esfeld et al. (2014), Miller (2014) and Callender (2014) don’t characterise their posi-
tion as involving a non-standard form of Humeanism. For these authors, it remains
the case that only the nomological facts arise from a best-systems analysis; so for them,
making this Humean move requires treating the wavefunction as nomological rather
than ontological. Although they recognise that this treatment of the wavefunction
may require some revision of our usual conception of laws,16 I think that the more sig-
nicant novelty is that we are utilising a best systemwhose vocabulary is not conned
to terms referring to individuals and properties in the supervenience basis.17 Bhogal
and Perry, however, do discuss this departure from more standard presentations of
Humeanism:18
The way we do this is by expanding the language that candidate systems
can be formulated in. As before [i.e., in standardHumeanism], systems can
use vocabulary that refers to perfectly natural properties (the properties
that make up the mosaic)—what we’ve called the “base language.” But in
addition to this they can introduce and use any other vocabulary so long
as it comes in uninterpreted.
How does such uninterpreted vocabulary come to have content? It can
have content if a system links the novel vocabulary to the base language;
14See Dürr et al. (1992) for a more detailed discussion of the role of the QEH in Bohmian mechanics. I
assume that the Bohumean should include the QEH in the best system, given the role that it plays in
the deriving the Born rule within Bohmianmechanics; I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting
it.
15Presumably, this will involve understanding probabilities in a Humean fashion; as a referee pointed
out, this will plausibly require expanding the criteria for best-system-hood to include t. I will put
this complication aside.
16Callender, in particular, discusses this in detail.
17If the wavefunction Ψ did refer to anything in the basis, then we would instead be dealing with
something like the Albert/Loewer/Darby strategy.
18Albeit one which—as they observe—is pregured by Lewis (1994)’s discussion of chance, and Hall
(2009)’s discussion of mass and charge.
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that is, if the system contains sentences that contain both novel vocabulary
and the already interpreted vocabulary of the base language.19
This is not the only place such a liberalised form of Humeanism has been enter-
tained. In the debate over the foundations of spacetime theory, Huggett (2006) has
suggested that one can take as fundamental just a basis of Leibnizian distance rela-
tions, by using liberalised Humeanism of this kind to introduce inertial structure:
My proposal is that there are a wider range of strategies that can be em-
ployed in the service of systematizing a Humean (in this case, relational)
history; the strongest-simplest system might involve laws formulated in
terms of natural properties and supervenient properties.20
And Stevens,21 following a suggestion of Pooley,22 has looked at how such an approach
could be extended to a defence of the “dynamical approach” to relativity:23 here, the
suggestion is that only the topological or dierential structure of spacetime is taken as
fundamental, with all other spatiotemporal structure constructed via a best-systems
analysis.
One could also imagine yet further extensions. For instance, one could maintain
that the only things which fundamentally exist are phenomenological experiences,
with everything else showing up as aspects of the best system for codifying and sum-
marising those experiences; or, one could even apply the same strategy to a funda-
mental basis consisting only of one’s own experiences, with a best system constructed
from that. Such positions raise a stability question for liberalised Humeans, at least
if they don’t want to advocate Berkumeanism or Hulipsism (as I propose to call these
doctrines): if Bohumeanism is a compelling position, then why not Berkumeanism?
After all, by construction these bases are more epistemically accessible than either a
basis of Bohmian trajectories. However, I don’t intend to pursue this line of thought
here.
Instead, in the remainder of this paper, I raise three problems for the aspiring Bo-
humean (which are not faced by the Humean about laws). The rst is a general prob-
lem with extending Humeanism from nomic to ontic matters (and so applies equally
19(Bhogal and Perry, 2015, p. 5)
20(Huggett, 2006, p. 50)
21Stevens (2015), Stevens (forthcoming)
22Pooley (2013)
23Brown (2005), Brown and Pooley (2006)
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to regularity relationalism); the second and third are specic to the Bohumean pro-
posal (and so, are reasons why even those sympathetic to regularity relationalism
should resist Bohumeanism).
4 The status of Humean ontology
The rst problem is this: what is the status of the new structure (the wavefunction,
or the inertial spacetime structure)? Specically, what is involved in committing to
such structure?24 Prima facie, there are two options. It could be that the new struc-
ture does not represent any further ontological commitments beyond those made by
commitment to the supervenience basis; or, it could be that the new structure does rep-
resent a further ontological commitment, albeit to structure that is not metaphysically
fundamental. Let us consider these options in turn.
4.1 Ontological innocence
First, the claim that the new structure represents no further commitment. I assume
that Bohumeans will want to claim that our discourse about wavefunctions is in good
standing, in the sense that when we make claims about wavefunctions we say things
which are meaningful and, under the standard success-conditions accepted by the
discourse, true. In other words, I put aside the claim that our talk of wavefunctions
should be understood as a wholesale or creative ction, with no more bearing on the
actual condition of the world than the work of a Tolkien or a Trump.
Thus, ifwavefunction-discourse is not to represent further ontological commitments,
then there would seem to be two options: either we are eliminativist about it (so it rep-
resents no commitment at all), together with some kind of paraphrasing strategy for
understanding wavefunction-talk; or we claim that it is an “ontological free lunch”
(so it represents no further commitment, beyond what we have committed to in the
supervenience basis).25
This would make our attitude to the wavefunction parallel to, say, van Inwagen’s
view of composite objects:
24Note that this is a question that only liberalised Humeans must address. Since classical Humeanism
doesn’t use a best-system analysis to introduce new ontology, it does not need to settle the issue
of our commitment to that ontology: classical Humeanism merely delimits the range of nomically
possible worlds, rather than modifying the structure of those worlds.
25The phrase is due to Armstrong (1997).
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Myposition vis-à-vis tables and other inanimate objects is simply that there
are none. Tables are not defective objects or second-class citizens of the
world; they are just not there at all. But perhaps this wretched material
mode is a part of the diculty. Let us abandon it. There are certain prop-
erties that a thing would have to have to be properly called a ‘table’ on
anyone’s understanding of the word, and nothing has all of these proper-
ties.26
Or to David Lewis’ view of composite objects:
...Mereology is ontologically innocent.
To be sure, if we accept mereology, we are committed to the existence of
all manner of mereological fusions. But given a prior commitment to cats,
say, a commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment. The fusion
is nothing over and above the cats that compose it. It just is them. They
just are it. Take them together or take them separately, the cats are the
same portion of Reality either way. Commit yourself to their existence all
together or one at a time, it’s the same commitment either way. If you draw
up an inventory of Reality according to your scheme of things, it would be
double counting to list the cats and then also list their fusion. In general, if
you are already committed to some things, you incur no further commit-
ment when you arm the existence of their fusion. The new commitment
is redundant, given the old one.27
Or to the early Carnap’s view of non-observational language:
Quite generally, everything that we talk about must be reducible to what
I have experienced. Everything that I can know refers either to my own
feelings, representations, thoughts and so forth, or it is to be inferred from
my perceptions. Each meaningful assertion, whether it concerns remote
objects or complicated scientic concepts, must be translatable into a state-
ment that speaks about contents of my own experience and, indeed, at
most about my perceptions.28
The problem, however, is that in all these cases a very specic kind of connection is
posited between the “base” ontology (parts of objects, observational structure) and the
26(Van Inwagen, 1990, pp. 99-100)
27(Lewis, 1991, pp. 81–82)
28(Carnap, 1929, p. 12); quoted and translated in (Coa, 1991, p. 227).
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“superstructure” ontology (composite objects, non-observational structure), which
undergirds the claim that the latter encodes no further ontological commitments be-
yond the former: namely, that claims about the superstructure can be translated into
claims about the base. Thus, both van Inwagen and Lewis agree that any statement
about chairs could (in principle, and assuming a suitably powerful language) be re-
placed by an appropriately ontologically hygienic statement about simples arranged
chairwise,29 whilst Carnap argues that any statement must admit of a translation into
some observational statement.
I claim that the possibility of such a translation is a precondition of either elimina-
tivism or “free-lunch-ism” about a category of ontological objects.30 If we are really
eliminativists about some domain of discourse A, then we are committed to thinking
that it is (in principle) dispensable, in the sense that any A-statement is merely a façon
de parler for some B-statement, and so could (in principle) be replaced by it. Alterna-
tively, if we are free-lunchers aboutA, then we need to think that the subjects of theA-
statements just are the subjects of the B-statements; if you tally up your commitments
by counting the As and the Bs, then you’ll have counted the same thing(s) twice. But
it follows from that that anything which is said about an A could be rephrased as an
equivalent statement about some Bs—namely, whatever Bs are the ones that just are
the A.
For example, in the context of relativistic theories, the Levi-Civita connection, and
hence the Ricci tensor and Ricci scalar, are denable in terms of the metric (in the
sense that a proper statement of the theory, if given in a language including terms for
the connection and the Ricci elds, should include the relevant denitions). Conse-
quently, although the Einstein Field Equations are typically phrased in terms of the
stress-energy tensor, metric, Ricci tensor and Ricci scalar, it is entirely natural to re-
gard our ontological commitments as exhausted by commitment to the metric and the
stress-energy tensor: after all, in principle one could write the EFEs purely in terms of
those two quantities. Thus, we can (depending on our tastes and inclinations) either
eliminate the metric and regard connection-talk as an elliptical way of talking about
29Assuming that there are indeed such simples. For the purposes of the point being made here, we
could equally well note that statements about chairs are, in principle, translatable into statements
about arbitrarily small parts of chairs.
30Note that the projection of articulating and defending such a translation occupies a signicant part
of van Inwagen’s work on mereology; and in his autobiographical reections, Carnap noted that
a key reason for his move away from stricter forms of empiricism was the recognition that “we
must abandon the earlier view that the concepts of science are explicitly denable on the basis of
observation concepts” (Carnap, 1963, p. 59).
12
themetric, or take connection-talk as talk of an entity that, though real, is nothing over
and above the metric.
However, in the cases of liberalised Humeanism, no such translation is to be had: it
will not be the case thatwe can translate an arbitrary statement about inertial structure
(say, that the Sun ismoving inertially) into a statement about topological or Leibnizian
relations, nor that an arbitrary statement about the wavefunction (say, that its value at
this point is such-and-such) into a statement about Bohmian particles. This should not
be surprising: if such a translation were on the table, then there would be no need for
the Humean manoeuvre at all. One could postulate a set of laws for the Leibnizian or
Bohmian structure directly (by translating the laws mentioning the inertial or wave-
function structure into Leibnizian or Bohmian terms), and just taking that theory to
be the fundamental theory.
To see that there cannot be such a translation, observe rst thatwheneverwedo have
a translation of A-discourse into B-discourse, then a given distribution of B-ontology
is consistent with at most one distribution of A-ontology.31 For, suppose that a distri-
bution β of B-ontology were consistent with two distinct distributions α1 and α2 of
A-ontology. Then α1 and α2 must disagree on the truth-value of some A-proposition
P : suppose that α1 makes P true, whilst α2 makes P false. But if there is a transla-
tion of A-discourse into B-discourse, we can translate P into a B-proposition Q. And
Q’s truth-value will be settled one way or the other by β: either β makes Q true, or β
makesQ false. In the rst case, β is consistent only with α1, and the in the second case,
β is consistent only with α2. The examples above illustrate this relationship between
denability and uniqueness: a distribution of cat-parts is consistent with just one dis-
tribution of cats; had the early Carnap been right, then a distribution of observational
structure would have been consistent with just one theoretical structure; and a given
metric is consistent with just one Levi-Civita connection.
But in general, a given distribution of the liberalisedHumean’s basic ontology (topo-
logical or Leibnizian relations, Bohmian trajectories) is consistent with various dier-
ent distributions of the new ontology (inertial structure, wavefunctions). For example,
a pair of globes joined by a rod and maintaining a xed distance from one another is
consistent with an inertial structure that takes them to be rotating, and with an iner-
tial structure that takes them to be non-rotating. In the case of Bohmian mechanics, a
given trajectory through conguration space is consistent with any twowavefunctions
31This is just a metaphysically-dressed-up version of the well-known model-theoretic fact that explicit
denability entails implicit denability.
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which agree on that trajectory.32 Indeed, agreement on the trajectory is sucient but
not necessary. Consider a Bohmian particle in a box:33 that is, a particle with one posi-
tional degree of freedom, which is conned to the unit interval [0, 1] (but is otherwise
free). Then the energy eigenfunctions of the system are of the form
φn(x) = sin(npix) (11)
for n = 1, 2, 3, . . . . As an eigenfunction, φn evolves under the Schrödinger equation
only into stateswhich are equivalent to φn (up to phase). But by the guidance equation,
dQ/dt = 0 if the wavefunction is φn, or if it is any wavefunction equivalent to φn . So
any pair of such eigenfunctions are associated to the same Bohmian trajectory: namely,
that of the particle remaining at rest.
Now, this isn’t directly a problem for the liberalised Humean: after all, although
there are multiple distributions of the full ontology consistent with the distribution of
the basic ontology, the Humean will simply claim that at most one features in the best
systematisation. (“At most one”, because it might be that the best systematisation of a
pair of globes or a single static particle in a boxmakes nomention of the inertial struc-
ture or wavefunctions at all.) But it does mean that there cannot be a direct translation
of wavefunction-talk into particle-talk; and correlatively, that the prospects for regard-
ing wavefunction-talk as elliptical for particle-talk, or for regarding wavefunctions as
nothing over and above particles, look dim.34
4.2 Ontological commitment
So now consider the alternative: that the new structure does represent a further on-
tological commitment, but to structure which is metaphysically non-fundamental.
There are two problems with this stance. One is that it starts to become unclear
whether anything has really been gained: if it remains the case that we are committed
to objectionably non-local or unobservable entities, and if our commitment to those
entities is a further commitment (beyond our commitment to the unobjectionable en-
tities in the Humean supervenience basis), then what does it matter whether such
entities have been treated to the honoric “fundamental” or not? Presumably, the
32Slightly more carefully, which agree on an arbitrarily small region around that trajectory.
33My presentation of this example follows Belot (2011), although the example goes back (at least) to
Einstein (1953): see Myrvold (2003).
34It also leads into some diculties about the relationship between models of the laws and nomic
possibility; see §5 below.
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attractiveness of the thesis of Humean supervenience is either due to some princi-
ple of parsimony, or else a feeling that entities not admissible to the basis (by virtue
of their non-locality, for instance) are somehow metaphysically dubious. But any
plausible parsimony principle will surely enjoin us to reduce our ontological com-
mitments in general, not merely to reduce our ontological commitments to fundamen-
tal objects in particular.35 And a commitment to something metaphysically dubious
is still queasy-making, independently of whether that something is fundamental or
non-fundamental.
The second problem is that if the newontological structure is a further commitment,
then truth is not grounded in being (or at least not in the way one would normally ex-
pect). For consider a proposition about the new structure; say, about thewavefunction.
First, suppose that this proposition is one included in the best system (e.g. the propo-
sition that there is a wavefunction). The question is then: what makes this proposition
true? What is the ground of the truth of this proposition? Normally, one would claim
that this proposition is true in virtue of the way in which the wavefunction is, that is,
in virtue of the state of the wavefunction. But according to the liberalised Humean,
what makes it the case that there is a wavefunction at all is simply the fact that the
proposition that there is a wavefunction is a part of the best systematisation of the fun-
damental facts. It is by virtue of being a part of the best system, together with the Bo-
humean analysis of what a wavefunction is, that that proposition gets to be true; and
it is (seemingly) in virtue of the truth of that proposition that a wavefunction exists.
Thus, the existence of the wavefunction is grounded in the truth of the proposition
that the wavefunction exists, and not vice versa.
Of course, the Bohumean can (and should) claim that the truth of thsi proposition
about the wavefunction is grounded in the facts about the distribution of the Bohmian
particles over time, so its truth is grounded in being in general. But it remains the case
that its truth is not grounded in the being of its subject matter, which is a rather odd state
of aairs—especially given that (ex hypothesi) propositions about the wavefunction are
not to be understood as elliptical claims about the Bohmian particles.
Could the liberal Humean claim that the grounding goes both ways: i.e., that the
truth of the proposition that a wavefunction exists is grounded in the existence of the
wavefunction, and vice versa? Only by advocating a peculiar view of grounding, ac-
cording to which the grounding relation is not asymmetric. [***expand?***] Note that
35Except, that is, insofar as our non-fundamental commitments are nothing over and above our fun-
damental commitments. But clearly, that just takes us back to the rst option discussed already.
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commitment to circular grounds is something that Humeans have generally sought
to avoid: for example, it is precisely in order to avoid circular grounds that Humeans
regarding laws have argued for a distinction between scientic grounding and meta-
physical grounding (the idea being that laws are metaphysically grounded in their
instances, as per Humean orthodoxy, but that instances are scientically grounded in
laws, as per the usual standards of scientic explanation).36
5 The problem of determinate quantities
The second problem concerns the extent to which the wavefunction is a determinate
quantity on the Bohumean picture. Again, we need to consider two possible ways the
Bohumean could make their case: either it is the case that the best system includes a
full specication ofΨ(x, 0)—and so settles every proposition about thewavefunction’s
value at all points of spacetime—or it does not. I’ll call a best system which does
include such a specication a full system, and a best system which does not a partial
system.
5.1 If the best system is a full system
If the best system does specify the value of the wavefunction at all points, then there
are two problems. First, there is the fact that treating the wavefunction as lawlike is
somewhat counterintuitive; since this is a well-known issue (which arises on other
treatments of Bohmian mechanics), and one already discussed at length in the litera-
ture,37 I don’t intend to dwell on it here.
The second problem is specic to Bohumeanism: it is just that it is prima facie highly
implausible that a specication of thewavefunction’s value everywhere in space could
possibly be a part of the best system, since it is such amassive quantity of information.
In David Albert’s vivid parable, a Humean summary is supposed to be “something
meaty and pithy and helpful and informative and short that [God] might be able to
tell you about the world which (you understand) would not amount to everything, or
nearly everything, but would nonetheless somehow amount to a lot”;38 and (to put it
mildly) it is hard to see how the specication of a complex number for every point of
36See Loewer (2012), Hicks and van Elswyk (2015).
37See, in particular, Dürr et al. (1997) and Callender (2014) for defences of the claim that the wavefunc-
tion may be considered lawlike.
38(Albert, 2015, p. 23)
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a vastly high-dimensional conguration space is supposed to t that bill.
If one was really wedded to the idea that the best system should be a full system,
then the only plausible response would be to rely on the fact that specifying a wave-
function will give much more information about what the trajectories are going to do,
i.e., will generate a stronger system. Perhaps, with the right way of balancing simplic-
ity against strength, the former factor will win out and the facts about the wavefunc-
tion get counted as part of the best system. In that case, however, a dierent problem
rears its head. If the gains in strength from specifying the wavefunction could be paid
for in the coin of simplicity, why would the same not be true of specifying the (initial)
positions of the particles? After all, much less data is involved in specifying where the
particles are than in specifying what the wavefunction is up to: the former is just 3N
real numbers, rather than uncountably many complex numbers (one for every point
of space). But the gains from this extra data are enormous, since (together with the
wavefunction) one obtains a perfect prediction of everything to happen at every mo-
ment. That would then, ad absurdum, make the initial conditions a lawlike matter.39
So the Bohumean who wants a full system faces a dilemma, neither horn of which
is palatable. If their rules for assessing the best system do not give strength enough
weight, then they cannot make it plausible that a direct specication of the wavefunc-
tion (at a time) will be included. And if their rules do give strength enough weight to
avoid this, then they cannot make it plausible that a direct specication of the particle
positions (at a time) will be excluded.
5.2 If the best system is not a full system
If the best system is not a full system, then there is a further choice point: either the
wavefunction does have a determinate value everywhere in spacetime, or it does not.
If it does not, then it becomes a vague and indeterminate sort of entity. On that anal-
ysis, it would be true that the wavefunction exists; given that the wavefunction is de-
ned as a map from times to complex-valued elds over conguration space, it would
presumably follow that the proposition at t, either the phase dierence between x and x′ is
pi/2 or it is not pi/2 is true (since that proposition is true for any such complex-valued
eld); yet neither disjunct has a determinate truth-value. So it would turn out that
quantum mechanics exhibits just the kind of indeterminacy and disrespect for classi-
39cf. (Hall, 2009, §5.6)
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cal logic that Bohmians are apt to deny!40
On the other hand, supposing that the wavefunction is everywhere determinate is
hardlymore palatable. For one thing, the problemof ungroundedpropositions (raised
in the last section) becomes even more acute. If the proposition that the phase dierence
between ψ(t, x) and ψ(t, x′) is pi/2 is true but not settled (even via a best-system analysis)
by the Humean mosaic of Bohmian particles, then it starts to look awfully as though
it could only be true primitively, in a manner that is not grounded in being at all.
Moreover, even if we suppose that the wavefunction is determinate in the actual
world, then there is still a problem regarding its determination in worlds that are
nomically possible relative to the actual world. It is worth noting that in this regard,
the Bohumean is worse o than the regularity relationalist.41 For, consider again the
“Newton’s globes” world: i.e., a world consisting of a pair of globes, joined by a rod,
which remain a xed distance from one another. Now, the regularity relationalist can
(and should) simply deny that this is a world which denes any inertial frames at
all: its motions are too impoverished to admit of interesting Newtonian laws, of the
kind that would require the introduction of inertial frames. The problem, however, is
that this world can also be analysed from the perspective of a world where Newton’s laws
do hold—that is, in which Newton’s laws (and the attendant commitment to inertial
frames) are part of the best system. That system is supposed to yield an account of
nomic possibility, which can be used for assessing scientic counterfactuals, explana-
tions, etc. But, at least on the face of it, that best system admits distinct nomic pos-
sibilities (distinct models of the laws) which correspond to the same relational facts:
e.g. the possibility according to which the spheres are rotating, and the possibility
according to which they are not. So, in eect, there are not enough metaphysically
possible worlds to account for all the nomically possible worlds; as a result, the laws
fail to determine a state of rotation for the globes world, as that single world has to do
double duty for possibilities with dierent states of rotation.
Huggett’s response is to point out that a relational world will not (he claims) typ-
ically be best systematised merely by Newtonian mechanics. Rather, the best system
will consist of Newtonian mechanics together with specic force laws, specifying (for
example) how much a rod would need to stretch in order to exert a given restoring
40If one is some kind of ctionalist about the wavefunction, then this isn’t so bad: the Sherlock Holmes
canon, after all, fails to settle the proposition that Holmes has a mole on his left shoulder. But Bo-
humeanism advertises itself, at least, as a means of reconciling a commitment to locality with real-
ism about quantum mechanics.
41See (Huggett, 2006, §3.2)
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force. And that system will not admit both the rotating- and stationary-globes worlds
as nomic possibilities: the force laws will specify how much restoring force is present
in the rod, which in turn determines what the acceleration (and hence state of rota-
tion) of the globes. This response depends, of course, on the assumption that there
are no absolutely rigid bodies; but that seems eminently reasonable.
However, this response does not extend to just any liberalised Humean proposal, as
Huggett notes:
One can imagine accounts of supervenient dynamical quantities akin to
mine, but with the feature that although the laws determine the values
of the quantities in worlds in which they are the laws, they do not in all
worlds in which they are true. That would mean that there were models
of the laws—distinguished by dierent possible values of the quantities—
that corresponded to the same nomically possible world. And that would
count against the account it seems.42
One can probably guess the punchline: the Bohumean case turns out to be just such
an account. Consider again the particle in a box discussed in §4.1. Here again, we
have a number of distinct models of quantum mechanics, which should therefore be
counted as distinct nomic possibilities (according to the laws of any world which is
best systematised by Bohmianmechanics). But because they all agree on the Bohmian
trajectories, according to the Bohumean, they correspond to the same possible world.
And unlike the case of the rotating globes, these distinct models are all models of
the same set of laws, even if we include “specic” laws such as force laws. Thus, the
newly introduced quantities fail to have determinate values at all nomically possible
worlds, and so Bohumeanism fails a test proposed by fellow liberal Humeans (accord-
ing to Huggett, “we should reject accounts that lead to laws which fail to determine
the supervenient quantities in all nomically possible worlds”).43
6 Scientic practice
6.1 The direct argument from scientic practice
The third problem concerns howwe are to verify—or at least, have reason to believe—
the claim that the best systematisation of the Humean mosaic is indeed Bohmian me-
42(Huggett, 2006, p. 60)
43(Huggett, 2006, p.70)
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chanics (or something like it). Themost explicit way to do sowould be to rst x some
set of trajectorieswhich is a plausible candidate to represent the actual evolution of the
world; then determine someway ofmeasuring the combined simplicity-plus-strength,
relative to those trajectories, of candidate “packages” of dierential equations and
wavefunctions (or other wavefunction-like things, appropriate to dierential equa-
tions dierent from Bohmian mechanics); and then show that the package consisting
of the guidance equation, Schrödinger equation, and some universal wavefunction are
maximal with respect to that measure.
This is an insanely dicult problem. First, we need to overcome the formidable hur-
dles of nding an appropriate means of evaluating candidate packages. Second, even
given such ameans, it would be extraordinary if the project of delineating those sets of
trajectories for which a Bohmian package is indeed the best system proved to be even
remotely mathematically tractable. Third, it is rather opaque what would be involved
in showing that a given Bohmian distribution is “a plausible candidate to represent the
actual evolution of the world”; but given that at least a necessary condition would be
that the distribution contain an unbelievably large number of particles, the prospects
for doing so do not look good. In other words, if the Bohumean is going to convince us
that their supervenience basis is best systematised by Bohmianmechanics, they aren’t
going to do so by direct computation.
In this regard, of course, they are in the same boat as standard Humeanism about
laws of nature. In general, Humeans have not sought to show directly that such-and-
such a theory is the best codication of such-and-such primitive categorical facts. (Al-
though it is worth noting that the direct computation is even less possible for the Bo-
humean than for the standard Humean, given that we’re now allowed to introduce
new theoretical vocabulary into the best system. This means that the available sys-
tems of equations to consider are not limited to just those equations employing only
a xed stock of variables and parameters (i.e., those ranging over the supervenience
basis); rather, we must consider any equations whose variables and parameters in-
clude that xed stock.) Instead, Humeans have usually taken the practice of science
itself to provide some reason for thinking that our actual scientic theories—or some
extension thereof—are plausible candidates for being the best systematisation of the
physical facts.
The reason this manoeuvre has legs is because the Humean standards of simplicity
and strength are not simply plucked from thin air: rather, they are exactly the stan-
dards to which (it is claimed) science typically adverts in determining what the laws
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are, given the evidence. Thus, Lewis remarks that he “[takes] a suitable system to be
one that has the virtues we aspire to in our own theory-building, and that has them
to the greatest extent possible given the way the world is”;44 and that “the standards
of simplicity, of strength, and of balance between them are to be those that guide us
in assessing the credibility of rival hypotheses as to what the laws are.”45 Hall (2015)
identies this as the “second guiding idea” of Humean supervenience:46
What the second guiding idea really needs to assume is that there are, im-
plicit in the practice of physics, evidential standards for determining what
the fundamental physical laws are that induce amapping from possible to-
tal bodies of evidence to something like a probability distribution (or perhaps
a family of such distributions) over propositions about the fundamental
laws of nature. [. . . ] we can summarize the second guiding idea this way:
the Humean reductionist is taking standards that both sides endorse—but
that his anti-reductionist opponent views solely as epistemic standards—
and elevating them to the status of standards constitutive of the laws of
nature.47
Call this argument the direct argument from scientic practice.
Now, merely liberalising our Humeanism will not cut o support from this argu-
ment. Indeed, Huggett makes use of essentially the same idea in defending his regu-
larity relationalism:
Consider Newton’s Principia. In the nal part of his Scholium to the def-
initions Newtona acknowledges that part of the problem facing him is to
determine the ‘truemotions’ from the ‘merely relative’; to work out the ab-
solute accelerations given that only relative motions are observable. How
does he do this? In large part, by showing that his dynamics [. . . ] pro-
vides the strongest-simplest axiomatisation of the relative motions of the
planets.48
44(Lewis, 1983, p. 367)
45(Lewis, 1986, p. 123)
46The rst guiding idea is the proposal that the relevant standards are, in particular, those of simplicity
and strength. Hall argues convincingly that we should take the second guiding idea as the core pro-
posal, with the rst guiding idea being a substantive (epistemic-cum-sociological) proposal about
what the standards of science in fact are.
47(Hall, 2015, p. 266)
48(Huggett, 2006, p. 48)
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Can the Bohumean make a similar appeal to scientic practice, to justify their claim
that Bohmian mechanics is the best systematisation of the Bohmian trajectories? Do-
ing so would mean defending the following claims: that the evidence available to
scientists is (some portion of) the facts in the supervenience basis; and that in seek-
ing to systematise this evidence, scientists have come up with Bohmian mechanics.
Unfortunately for the Bohumean, however, both of these claims are false.
First, the claim that the evidence basis for scientists comprises certain facts about
the Bohmian trajectories. The idea here will be (to paraphrase Bell) that all measure-
ments are measurements of position;49 and so—on the view of the world advanced by
Bohmians—any experimental data can be characterised in terms of the positions of
the Bohmian particles. The problem, however, is that our evidence for quantum me-
chanics is (famously) statistical in nature. It is not that we have direct access to some
small number of the Bohmian trajectories, and have successfully stitched those to-
gether by overlaying a wavefunction governed by quantum dynamics. What we have
instead are individual but imprecise measurements of positions at particular times.
By making many such measurements of identically prepared systems, and looking
at the frequency distributions of the results, we can obtain high conrmation of the
probability densities over such trajectories (on the Bohmian picture). So what we have
really woven together into a quantum tapestry are those probability densities, rather
than the trajectories themselves; and on the Bohmian’s own account, those probability
densities represent all that can ever be known for sure about the trajectories.50
Now, this might seem like nit-picking: surely probabilistic evidence about Bohmian
trajectories is still evidence. The trouble is that in order to establish an argument from
scientic practice analogous to that available to other Humeans (including regularity
relationalists), the Bohumean needs to establish that the particle trajectories are epis-
temically prior to the wavefunction, just as the relational motions are epistemically
prior to the structure of spacetime. Such a relation of epistemic priority would ensure
that any disputant would have to be inferring the laws from an evidential basis co-
inciding with the Humean’s supervenience basis: in the spacetime case for instance,
Huggett observes that “the only evidence available to Newton—to anyone, whatever
spatiotemporal ontology they adopt—is that of a relational history”.51 But because
49“[. . . ] in physics the onl yobservations we must consider are position observations, if only the posi-
tions of instrument pointers.” (Bell, 1987, p. 166)
50Of course, even our knowledge of the probability densities is somewhat indirect. But the point being
made here is just that it is nevertheless more direct than whatever knowledge we might have about
trajectories.
51(Huggett, 2006, p. 49)
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our access to the trajectories is only via the probability densities, no such priority re-
lation can be established. Yes, we can use the probability densities to make (partial)
inferences about the trajectories; but we can equally well use them to make inferences
about thewavefunction directly. Sowhat scientic practice (and theory) shows us here
is that the probability densities are epistemically prior to both the trajectories and the
wavefunction.
Nevertheless, one could still argue that a weaker form of the argument from scien-
tic practice holds: if scientic practice has indeed used Bohmianmechanics to codify
the (partial) information about trajectories represented in the probability densities,
then that would still be some evidence in favour of Bohmian mechanics’ credentials
as the best systematisation of the trajectories. However, just as a matter of sociological
fact, it is false that the scientic community has alighted on Bohmianmechanics as the
preferred theory for explaining and systematising quantum phenomena. What they
have in fact come up with is what we might call “ordinary” or “orthodox” quantum
mechanics:52 a messy, foundationally unclear, and yet incredibly empirically success-
ful combination of systematic dynamics, particular models, and pragmatic rules for
extracting empirical content. The exact content of this theory is still a matter of some
debate (for instance, whether the projection postulate or the eigenvalue-eigenstate link
should be included);53 but I take it to be reasonably clear that no matter how precisely
one draws the boundary, the theory does not coincide with Bohmian mechanics.
One might hold that this is irrelevant, given the empirical equivalence between
Bohmianmechanics and textbook quantummechanics:54 doesn’t that show that Bohmian
mechanics and textbook quantum mechanics are equally capable of systematising the
relevant data, and hence that it makes no odds (so far as the argument from scientic
practice is concerned) whether scientists have adopted one or the other? But whether
or not something is the best system is not invariant under empirical equivalence. After
all, textbook quantum mechanics is empirically equivalent to the theory consisting of
all and only its observational predictions—but no-one is going to think that that the-
ory is a serious candidate for best system. So we cannot use the empirical equivalence
of Bohmian and textbook quantum mechanics to argue that they are equally well (or
poorly) qualied to be best systems.
Alternatively, onemight just think it is obvious that no such hodge-podge as textbook
52Note that I take this to include both non-relativistic and relativistic quantum mechanics.
53See Wallace (unpublished).
54My thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern.
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quantummechanics could possibly be the best systematisation of the empirical data.55
But that’s just a reason to think that the argument from scientic practice is not a good
argument: if it’s clearly false that textbook quantummechanics is the best system, then
that shows that actualworking scientists do not always converge upon the best system,
not that they have not converged upon textbook quantum mechanics.
6.2 The indirect argument from scientic practice
Nevertheless, following this line of thought suggests a dierent move that the Bo-
humean could make. The Bohumean could concede (at least for the sake of argu-
ment) that orthodox quantum mechanics is a better systematisation of the empirical
data than Bohmian mechanics, but argue that this is irrelevant: the question at hand
is what the best systematisation of the Bohmian trajectories is, not what the best sys-
tematisation of the empirical data is. Now obviously, just asserting that claim by itself
is question-begging. But Bhogal and Perry outline a way of using scientic practice to
indirectly support this claim:
This worry, that mere positional facts wouldn’t be complicated enough
to distinguish something like Bohmian Mechanics as the best system of
that world, strikes us as far too pessimistic. One of the key motivating
thoughts behind the best system account is that whatever an ideal scien-
tist, if she was fully rational and knew everything about the state of the
mosaic, would take to be the best overall theory given the evidence is the
best system of that world.
Actual scientists are not ideal reasoners and they do not have access to the
entirety of the facts about themosaic. Of the elements of themosaic, actual
scientists only have direct access to facts about positions. [. . . ]
If we look to actual scientic practice, we see that physicists, even with ac-
cess to only a tiny slice of the position facts, have a great deal of condence
that theworld is quantummechanical (and consider this position verywell
55Indeed, in the literature on the philosophy of quantum mechanics one sometimes sees the view that
orthodox quantum mechanics is so muddled and incoherent as to fail to have any content at all—
which would surely guarantee that it is not the best system, regardless of whether scientists have
adopted it or not. But this just seems to me to be a reason to be very sceptical of that claim about
the content of orthodox quantum mechanics; indeed, one of the most striking features of quantum
physics is the extraordinary empirical success it has enjoyed despite the absence of anywidely agreed
account of its foundations. (Compare the discussion inWallace (2012) of the role decoherence plays
in making the measurement problem “a philosophical rather than a practical problem” (p. 4586).)
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conrmed). If this, in the grand scheme of things, meager set of position
facts is enough to satisfy non-ideal working scientists, then we see very
little reason to be skeptical that the ideal scientist, with access to all the po-
sition facts at our Bohmian world, would settle on a Bohmian Mechanical
physical theory.56
We could summarise this argument as follows:57
1. Non-ideal actual scientists have empirical access to coarse-grained data about
the trajectories.
2. Those scientists have come up with quantum mechanics as the best systemati-
sation of that data.
3. If an ideal scientistwere already committed to quantummechanics, thenBohmian
mechanics would be the best way to extend their commitment to include the
claim that particles follow exact trajectories.
4. So if an ideal scientist could somehow come to know that particles have trajec-
tories, then they would advocate Bohmian mechanics.
The argument is indirect because it still uses a counterfactual premise (premise 3)
about what an ideal scientist would do with access to certain data (whereas the direct
argument from scientic practice seeks to avoid making assumptions of this kind). So
inevitably, the support for this argument will be somewhat weaker, given that coun-
terfactuals like premise 3 can’t be as conclusively veried; of course, it also makes the
argument harder to decisively refute. So what I want to do here is just oer some
plausibility considerations against premise 3.
First, we need to be a little careful about the sense in which Bohmianmechanics and
quantum mechanics are empirically equivalent. That empirical equivalence means
that over those situations where both theories apply, they will generate the same predic-
tions. However, at least as things currently stand, there are many situations to which
quantum mechanics, but not Bohmian mechanics, can be successfully applied. Most
notably, although it is an ongoing (and important) frontier of research,58 there is cur-
rently no Bohmian version of quantum eld theory capable of fully replicating the
56(Bhogal and Perry, 2015, p. 18)
57I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this way of formulating the argument, and for
suggesting that Bhogal and Perry should be interpreted as making this argument rather than the
direct argument.
58See Struyve (2010) for a survey.
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standard formalism; that cuts o support from the predictive success of high energy
physics. Thus, Bohmian mechanics is less strong than textbook quantum mechanics.
Of course, this isn’t to say that this will always remain the case: extending the scope
and range of Bohmian analyses is an important and ongoing research project. The
point being made here is just that whilst that project is still ongoing, comparing the
two theories on strength will favour textbook quantum mechanics.
Second, there is a question aboutwhether the (counterfactual) scientists’ knowledge
of trajectories is itself consistent with Bohmian mechanics. After all, it is part of the
content of Bohmian mechanics that the trajectories cannot be precisely known by any
physical means: scattering a photon o the particle, say, will perturb the particle to at
least the degree of precision given by the shortness of the photon wavelength. So to
posit Bohmian mechanics as the best systematisation of the trajectories would mean
characterising one’s own knowledge of those trajectories as supernatural. This means
that we are dealing with a kind of epistemic instability, analogous to that in the case of
Boltzmann brains: the very theory that is supposed to codify and account for a certain
kind of evidence also points to that evidence being unreliable or inadmissible.
Third, recall that (by hypothesis) the particles are distributed in such a way that the
best Bohmian systematisation is one according to which the Quantum Equilibrium
Hypothesis holds. But that means that the wavefunction by itself suces to deter-
mine the probability distribution of the Bohmian particles. Hence, by characterising
the dynamics of the wavefunction, textbook quantum mechanics also serves to char-
acterise the dynamics of that probability distribution. And, as is well-known, there
is no in-principle barrier to thinking that the best system might be one that merely
characterises the probabilities for how things are distributed (rather than their cate-
gorial distribution): provided that the gains in simplicity are enough to oset the loss
in strength, the probabilistic system can win out over the deterministic one.
Now, the point I’m trying to make here is not that textbook quantum mechanics is,
necessarily, the best systematisation. Indeed, I am condent that one could, with a
little creativity, cook up plausibility arguments that point to some form of GRW dy-
namics, or a stochastic particle theory, or something dierent yet again, as the best
system. The aim of the above is to illustrate that, until and unless the Humean tells
us considerably more about the criteria for evaluation of systems, any guess at what
the best systematisation of some data might be will be highly contestable, and con-
strained only by the ingenuity of philosophers. And of course, these diculties are
only increased when—as here—that data is itself empirically inaccessible.
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7 Conclusion
To conclude, let’s take a brief step back, and think about how Bohumeanism compares
to Humeanism about classical physics. The reason the problems in the previous sec-
tion arise is that the Bohumean is, in one crucial respect, worse o than her classical
cousin: the latter could, at least, identify the kind of structure in the supervenience ba-
sis (i.e., intrinsic properties of points or pointlike things) with the experimental data
that (idealised) science collects, and hence argue that the vast parallel-processor of
the scientic enterprise has in fact systematised that data into an optimally simple
and strong codication. By doing so, the classical Humean can relieve some of the
pressure to make precise the nature of the best systematisation they envisage, or to
show that such a thing is even possible, since science itself could be taken as demon-
strating a proof of principle. The experimental basis for quantum mechanics, on the
other hand, is a poor t with the supervenience basis of the Bohumean. On the one
hand, it is too big: it covers many more situations than those to which Bohmian me-
chanics (at its current state of development) is readily applied. On the other, it is too
small: the proposed supervenience basis (even over some local region) goes far be-
yond what could be gathered by empirical investigation (even in principle). Without
this tight t between the supervenience basis and the empirical basis, I don’t see how
empirical practice can be a source of optimism that Bohmianmechanics is, indeed, the
best systematisation of the supervenience basis.
But this prompts a further question. Classically, a signicant component of the mo-
tivation for Humean Supervenience has been taken to be epistemic: since what we have
direct epistemic access to (the thought goes) are facts about intrinsic properties of in-
dividual spacetime points or pointlike entities, we should seek ametaphysics founded
upon those facts. (This isn’t to claim that Humeans are committed to this claim about
the nature of scientic evidence; it’s just that without such a claim, it’s not obvious
what the advantage is of insisting that all physical facts be local facts.) Now, one can
certainly criticise this move, from a premise about what is epistemically available to
a conclusion about what is metaphysically acceptable.59 If, though, the practice of
quantum physics does not help the Humean, then we should start to question the an-
tecedent claim too. After all, we do in fact perform entanglement experiments, which
(at least on some interpretations of quantummechanics) constitute the observation of
non-Humean facts! So what is going on?
59See Maudlin (2007) for a particularly biting critique.
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The answer, I contend, is that although individual observations are indeed (some-
what) localised, it just does not follow that those observations cannot provide infor-
mation about or evidence for irreducibly global goings-on. Prima facie, at least, the
way in which one does so is about the simplest imaginable: we simply make multi-
ple local observations, and then aggregate those observations. Suppose, for example,
that mass was not locally conserved, but was conserved on some larger scale—let’s
say, on the scale of the Earth. It is straightforwardly possible to accumulate evidence
for this hypothesis, by making continuous observations at dierent points of space,
and then comparing the results. Mass disappears here, we nd; but we then nd that
just the same quantity reappeared elsewhere, at exactly the same time. Obviously, no
one observer could simultaneously verify the reappearance and the disappearance of
the mass. But that’s not a problem, given that they can write down their results and
compare them, at a later date, with other observers. And clearly, this kind of pro-
cess is somewhat more involved than the experimental processes needed to conrm
or disconrm a purely local phenomenon—and were the non-local phenomena more
widespread (either covering a larger, or concerning more kinds of phenomena), then
it might well move beyond our capacities to verify it. But less pervasive non-locality
seems like something well within our conrmatory capacities.
The point of this little parable, of course, is that it’s more or less exactly what we do
to verify the non-local aspects of quantum mechanics:60 we make simultaneous local
measurements in multiple locations, and then bring the results together to compare
them. So the simplistic picture of scientic evidence that seemingly motivates the
doctrine of Humean Supervenience is long due retirement—andwith it, the insistence
that our best scientic theories be made to t that doctrine, at whatever price.61
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